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Abstract 
 
 
This paper assesses how inflation react to monetary policy shocks in South Africa during the inflation 
targeting period by making use of the structural vector error correction model (SVECM).  The results 
of the impulse response function obtained from the SVECM show that, on average, contractionary 
monetary policy that intends to curb inflationary pressure has been impotent in South Africa. However, 
the contractionary monetary policy shocks managed to reduce output. The paper suggests that it is time 
a dual target, inflation and output, be considered in South Africa to avoid the harm caused on output 
growth from monetary policy actions related to the constraint of inflation targeting.  
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1.         Introduction 
 
Inflation targeting has become a monetary policy of choice in several countries since the 1990s. The 
policy was pioneered in New Zealand in 1990. As for emerging markets, Chile was the first country to 
adopt inflation targeting in 1991 (Mishkin, 2000). With regards to the operations of inflation targeting 
policy, monetary authority sets an explicit target for inflation rate and communicates the target to the 
public. Moreover, the monetary authority makes use of the main policy instrument, the interest rate, to 
control the level of inflation. The conventional practice for the control of inflation is that the central 
bank, the monetary authority, raises the interest rate to cool down the economy to subdue inflationary 
pressure. Thus, inflation targeting central banks rely on interest rate, especially contractionary monetary 
policy, to compel inflation to remain within the target. However, Stiglitz (2008) noted that this practice 
is always not successful, especially in emerging and developing economies, as these economies often 
miss the target due to circumstances beyond the control of their central banks. Consequently, for Stiglitz, 
inflation targeting policy has failed in emerging markets and developing economies.  
 
A number of authors attribute the failure of monetary policy instruments to contain inflationary pressure 
in emerging and developing economies to their vulnerability to global shocks ( Mishkin and Schmidt-
Hebbel, 2007; Blanchard and Gali, 2007). Commodities and trade shocks have been found to be larger 
and more persistent and have contributed to the macroeconomic volatility in emerging and developing 
countries (Mendoza, 1995).  
 
Among other things, the effectiveness of a monetary policy is assessed by its ability to control inflation, 
albeit in the presence of external shocks (See for example, Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1999; Rasche and 
Williams, 2005). It is then important to evaluate how monetary policy instruments has fared in affecting 
inflation in emerging markets in general and in South Africa during the inflation targeting period.  With 
a potent monetary policy instrument, it is expected that contractionary monetary policy shocks should 
be able to reduce inflationary pressure.   
 
South Africa adopted inflation targeting as the anchor of monetary policy in February 2000. The initial 
target, decided by the Minister of Finance in collaboration with the South African Reserve Bank 
(SARB), was to achieve an average inflation rate of between six and three percent interval in 2002. 
The SARB has used the repo rate as the policy instrument to control the level of inflation and contain 
it within the chosen interval. The effectiveness of the policy instrument to control the level of inflation 
has been widely criticised not only in the South African context but also internationally. With the 
critics pointing out from a substantial lag for monetary policy changes to affect inflation to the inability 
of the policy instrument to effectively affect inflation level (see Bernanke and Woodford, 1997 and 
Mishkin, 2002). Since early 2007 the annual inflation rate in South Africa has evolved outside the interval 
of three to six percent. The continual increase in the repo rate to curtail the inflation rate has accelerated 
its trend rather than subduing it. The aim of this study is therefore to assess the extent to which the 
monetary policy instrument, the repo rate, has managed on average to influence inflation rate and 
economic activities in South Africa. This paper uses the structural vector error correction model 
(SVECM) to characterise the dynamics of inflation to monetary policy instrument shocks. Furthermore, 
this study also assesses the responses of the credit extended to the private sector and the real domestic 
product (GDP) to monetary policy instrument shocks. The remaining of the paper is structured as 
follows: Section 2 the theories and literature review on inflation targeting policy. Section 3 discusses 
the trend of inflation and the monetary policy instrument in South Africa. Section 4 discusses the data 
and methodology of the SVEC model. Section 5 focuses on empirical results and discussion on the 
findings of the paper. Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2.         Literature review 
 
Inflation rate targeting (IT) was first adopted as monetary policy by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand 
in 1990, followed by the Bank of Canada in 1991, and the Bank of England in 1992. It has gained 
popularity in both industrial countries and emerging economies. To date the number of countries 
following this monetary policy is more than twenty. 
  
Svensson (2007) argues that a successful IT policy is characterized by, (1) an announcement of the 
numerical inflation target, (2) an implementation of monetary policy that gives a major role to an 
inflation forecast, (3) an adoption of short-term interest rates as the only monetary policy instrument, 
and (4) a high degree of transparency and accountability. Proponents of inflation targeting policy 
(Bernanke et al., 1999; Nadal De Simone, 2001; Corbo, Landerretche, and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002; 
Neumann von Hagen, 2002; Hyvonen, 2004; IMF, 2005; Vega and Winkerlied, 2005; Mishkin and 
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2007) demonstrate empirically that inflation targeting is associated with an 
improvement in overall economic performance. According to these authors the rationale behind this 
success is that by targeting directly price, inflation target plays a role of explicit and a strong nominal 
anchor. 
 
 
The application of the IT policy necessitates that the monetary authority announces the numerical 
target (point or interval). The central bank should also set out the period within which inflation will 
reach the target level. Whenever the inflation is outside the target, the central bank uses the short-
term interest rates to bring it back within the target range. Such an explicit mandate requires 
independence of monetary authority, which in turn is accountable for missing the objective. The issue 
of accountability leads to improved communication or transparency with the public through the 
published inflation reports, minutes of monetary policy committee meetings and inflation forecasts of 
central bank econometric models. Without accountability and transparency, it is difficult to establish 
credibility, and hence anchor inflation expectation.
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The results of different studies suggest that inflation levels, persistence, and volatility are lower in 
inflation-targeting countries than in ‘nontargeters’. Furthermore, output volatility has improved during 
the post-targeting period.  Finally, exchange rate pass-through effects have been reduced after the 
adoption of IT. Besides the improvement of economic performance, Johnson (2002, 2003) provides 
strong evidence of an immediate fall in inflation expectations after the adoption of IT. Likewise, 
Gürkaynak, Levin, and Swanson (2007); Levin, Natalucci, and Piger (2004); Castelnuovo, Nicoletti-
Altimari, and Palenzuela (2003) argue eloquently that inflation expectations are more anchored for 
targeters than nontargeters, particularly at longer horizons. Consequently, supporters of this view claim 
strongly that monetary policy has become more efficient under inflation- targeting. 
 
 
On the other hand, Ball and Sheridan (2005), Roger and Stone (2005), Epstein and Yeldan 
(2007) state that the earlier victory proclaimed by the proponents of IT is still to be tested. Their 
analysis shows that industrialized ‘nontargeters’, like targeters, have experienced low inflation and high 
output growth during the same period. Similarly, for the same period their volatility of inflation 
and output growth declined. Hence, one cannot attribute a recent disinflation and increase in 
output growth solely to the success of the IT policy. As Ball and Sheridan (2005) clearly put it, the 
economic environment has been fairy tranquil during the inflation-targeting era, and central banks 
have not been tested severely. Likewise, Rogoff (2007) assigns these benefits to the forces of 
globalization. To support the effectiveness and success of IT, it should be tested during the hostile 
periods of high inflation, such as the current rise in global food and oil prices. 
 
 
3.         Inflation Targeting in South Africa 
 
 
 
Like many emerging market economies, in the aftermath of the Asian crisis, the South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB) adopted inflation rate targeting as its monetary policy in early 2000. Inflation becomes 
the primary and sole mandate of SARB, with a freely floating exchange rate. Similar to many targeters, 
the adherence to this new monetary policy framework reinforced the SARB independence. SARB 
ascribes to 3-6% target range to be achieved within the two years after its adoption. 
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  The subsequent characteristics of IT, as explained above, became reality in the South African context. 
To achieve its credibility the SARB should bring inflation rate within the target range by increasing or 
decreasing its monetary instrument, the repo rate. The repo rate, which represents the cost of holding 
money, is the rate that the SARB charges commercial banks. By using the repo rates the SARB 
controls directly liquidity in the market. For example, if the central bank feels that there is excess 
liquidity in the market, it increases the repo rate to create shortage. The commercial banks will react to 
this contractionary monetary policy by increasing their lending rates. This will result in the decrease in 
the money demand and consequently the total demand. As the total demand decreases, the price level 
will tend to fall. 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that inflation rate first reached the target band in August 2001. However, this success 
was short lived, in that the terrorist attack in the US on September 11, combined with massive 
depreciation of South African Rand put high pressure on inflation rate reaching a pick of 10.5% in 
October 2002. The SARB reacted by increasing the repo rate (see Figure 2) from December 2001 to 
September 2002 where the repo rate increased from 9.5% to 13.5%, respectively. The central bank 
action combined with the investigation committee, initiated by the government to investigate 
possibility of speculative attacks against the Rand, helped reduced inflation. Inflation was reduced 
gradually to below 6% in June 2003. The decline in inflation was followed by monetary easing up to 
8% in December 2003. As depicted in Figure 1, inflation was back in up trend in March 2005 
crossing the 6% limit in June 2007. From June 2006, onward the SARB has followed a contractionary 
policy increasing the repo rate from 7% to 11% in December 2007; that is, an increase of 4%. In the 
same time inflation, has increased from 3.9 to 8.6% for the same period. During the period 2007 
to 2009, inflation has increased, reaching the 12% level in 2008. This shows the influence of the global 
financial crisis or external shocks on the South African inflation rate. Figure 2 overlays the headline 
inflation rate and the repo rate, the SARB’s policy rate. The aim is to see whether the increase in the 
policy rate was successful in decreasing the inflation rate. It is difficult to tell from to conclude from 
the graphical representation on the comovement of the two variables as they seem to depict pro-
cyclicality in a number of periods. Also, it is difficult to detect clearly any lag effect, which is necessary 
in the reaction between the two variables. thus, this can only be a matter of empirical analysis. 
 
Figure 1.  Inflation (CPIX) 
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Figure 2.  Inflation and Repo rates 
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4. Methodology of the SVEC model 
 
In assessing how monetary policy instrument affects inflation in South Africa this paper uses the SVEC 
model to characterise the dynamics of inflation rate to monetary policy instrument shocks. The 
modelling of dynamic behaviour of economic variables, through the impulse response function (IRF) 
analysis, is extensively used in a vector autoregressive (VAR) framework. Nonetheless the VAR model 
is “a-theoretic” and therefore there is little economic content in the results provided from the IRF 
analysis. Like structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) models, the SVEC models provide a framework 
where the results that are obtained from the IRF have an economic meaning. Contrary to SVAR 
models, SVEC models are suitable for identifying economic shocks when cointegration relationship 
exists between variables in the model. SVEC analysis starts from a reduced form standard VEC model 
 
t1pt1p1t11t
'
t y...yyy     (1) 
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Where ty  is a 1K  vector of time series, 1p1 ...   are KK  coefficient matrices. The reduced 
form disturbance t is a 1K unobservable zero mean white noise process with covariance matrix
 . From Johansen’s (1995) version of the Granger’s representation theorem it follows that the VEC 
model has the following moving average representation 
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   is an infinite-order polynomial in the lag operator with 
coefficient matrices 
*
j  that tend to zero as .j   It contains transitory effects. The term 
*
0y  
contains all initial values of the vector time series (). The forecast error impulse responses based on   
and the )L(  are without economic meaning as they are obtained from the reduced form disturbance 
(see Equation 2). Structural shocks need to be identified for a meaningful impulse response analysis. 
The relationship between the reduced-form disturbances and the underlying structural shocks is written 
as follows:  
 
tt A   (3) 
 
Where 1K  vector t  contains the unobservable structural shocks, and has a covariance of   . 
Substituting Equation (3) in Equation (2) yield a structural IRF given by A . The long-run effects of 
t  shocks will therefore be given by A . This matrix has a rank rK  , where r is the cointegrating 
rank of the system. In particular, if the system has r cointegrating relations, )rK(k   shocks have 
permanent effects, while at most r shocks have transitory effects. To exactly identify permanent shocks 
2/)1k(k   additional restrictions (elements of the matrix A  set to zero) are needed. Similarly, 
2/)1r(r   additional contemporaneous restrictions are needed to identify the transitory shocks. 
Together, these are a total of 2/)1K(K   restrictions necessary to just identify matrix A. 
 
5. Data and Empirical Analysis 
 
This study employs seasonally adjusted monthly data for South Africa for the period from February 
2000 to August 2016. February 2000 corresponds with the official starting of inflation targeting policy. 
In the benchmark specification, the SVEC model includes the following variables: 
- The natural logarithm of credit extension (CREDIT)  
- The natural logarithm of manufacturing production used as a proxy for real gross domestic 
product (MANU). Figure A1 shows that the two series present a common trend and may be 
used of a proxy of each other. 
- the prime rate as a proxy for repo rate (INTEREST). Figure A1 shows that the trend of the 
prime rate corresponds to the repo rate.  
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- The headline inflation rate1 (INFLA) 
- The international commodity price (COM) as an exogenous variable in the SVEC model to 
control for price puzzle 
 
The series are sourced from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) database. Table A1 in the 
Appendix presents the unit root test of all the endogenous variables. All the endogenous variables are 
integrated of order one, I (1). This was tested with the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test whereby 
a trend was included in the test for the series CREDIT and MANU and only constant was included 
for INTEREST and INFLA. 
 
As the SVECM analysis necessitates that variables be cointegrated and that the number of cointegrating 
relationship be known for the identification of shocks, Table A2 presents the trace test statistics. For 
the testing procedure, the Johansen trace test was used. The number of autoregressive lags in the 
system chosen according to the Akaike Information Criteria is two. Table A2 indicates that there is 
existence of two cointegrating relationships in the system. 
 
The vector of structural shocks in this study is given as  ',,, INTERSTCREDITMANUt ttINFLAtt   . As in 
section 4, for a 4-variable VEC we need 62/)1K(K    linearly independent restrictions to exactly 
identify the structural shocks. Since we have two cointegrating relations (r = 2), the number of shocks 
with permanent effects are 2 rKk . A total of 2 shocks will have permanent effects, whereas 
2r  shocks have transitory effects.  In our 4-variable VEC model we assume that only shocks in 
CREDIT will not have permanent effects. To identify the three permanent shocks, 12/)1( kk  
additional restriction is imposed in the long-run impact matrix A . So we will assume in addition 
that productivity is only driven by technology shocks, 
MANU .  
 
The identification of the long run matrix A  in the 4-variable system is as follows: 
 















0*0*
0*0*
0*0*
000*
A          (4) 
 
Unrestricted elements are indicated by asterisk. Referring to the vector of structural shock above, the 
interpretation of the above matrix is that shocks to PRICE have no long run effects on MANU, 
CREDIT or INTEREST. Also, shocks to INTEREST have no long-run effects on MANU, CREDIT 
and INFLA. The rationale behind the interpretations is that nominal variables such as price and interest 
should not influence economic activity in the long term. Another interpretation from this matrix, as 
discussed above, is that productivity is only driven by technology shocks,
MANU , and not any other 
shock.  
 
As said earlier we need 6 linearly independent restrictions to exactly identify the structural shocks. But 
as it stands now the two zero columns represent 4kr linearly independent restrictions and the zeros 
in (4) represent only five linearly independent restrictions. We then need in addition 12/)1( rr
contemporaneous restriction to unravel the effects of the two transitory shocks. The one additional 
                                                          
1It is important to note that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) was targeting CPIX-inflation from 2000 t0 2008 instead of the 
headline CPI. In 2008 the SARB reverted back to targeting headline CPI inflation 
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restriction is therefore reported in the contemporaneous or short term matrix A. The choice made is 
that shocks to INFLA do not contemporaneously affect INTEREST. There should be a lag effect, 
especially in the case of South Africa. The short run matrix is therefore represented as 
 















**0*
****
****
****
A   
 
It is important to note that the VECM from which our SVEC model is derived is estimated with 
four endogenous variables ordered as MANU, INFLA, CREDIT and INTEREST and COM as 
the exogenous variable. Following the steps explained above for the SVEC estimation, we obtain 
the results of the impulse response functions (IRF) reported in Figures 3, 4 and 5.
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6. Discussion of the Results 
 
Figures 3, 4 and 5 provide the responses of INFLA, MANU and CREDIT to monetary policy shocks, 
respectively. Confidence intervals for the impulse responses are bootstrapped by procedure described 
in Breitung, Bruggeman, and Lutkepohl (2004). Bootstrap from percentile method proposed by Hall 
(1992) is used to construct the 95% confidence interval. 
 
Figure 3.  Responses of inflation (INFLA) to monetary policy shocks  
  
 
 
      ---- 95% Hall percentile confidence interval 
____ SVECM impulse response functions 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 shows that a positive monetary policy shocks, monetary policy contraction, reduces slightly 
inflation but the effect is not statistically different to zero at 95% confidence level2. This outcome 
points to the possibility that either positive monetary shocks are unable to cause a decrease in inflation 
or that there is substantial lag in the effect of monetary policy on inflation rate. Whichever the case 
may be, this indicates the ineffectiveness of monetary policy instrument in affecting inflation in South 
Africa.  This finding is supported by a number of studies (see Bonga-Bonga and Kabundi, 2013; Gupta 
and Komen, 2008).  The inability of the monetary policy shocks to influence the level of inflation raises 
a concern on the success of inflation targeting monetary policy stance. This apprehension is echoed by 
Jean-Claude Trichet, the former president of the European Central Bank (ECB), remarking that central 
banks do their best work when their threats to raise interest rate deter inflation actions3.   
 
Figure 4 displays the reaction of the manufacturing production, proxy for GDP, to monetary policy 
shocks.  
  
                                                          
2 Although there seems to be a statistically negative effect from periods 9 to 12, we cannot discard that the upper bound 
of the confidence interval is not different to zero. This was confirmed with the 95% Efron percentile confidence 
interval.  
3 From the article titled “ECB likely to hold rates steady and enjoy the gap” published in the Sunday time 
newspaper of 9 March 2008. 
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Figure 4. Responses of manufacturing production to monetary policy shocks 
 
 
---- 95% Hall percentile confidence interval 
____ SVECM impulse response functions 
 
 
 
There is a clear negative effects of positive monetary policy shocks on manufacturing production in 
South Africa, before the effect dies out after ten months. While monetary policy shocks are not able 
to reverse an increasing trend in inflation, as seen in Figure 3, however, these shocks happen to depress 
economic growth. This outcome provides enough reason to question the effectiveness of inflation 
targeting in South Africa. It is important to note that a number of studies attribute the failure of the 
monetary policy tool to contain inflationary pressure in emerging and developing economies to the 
growing influence of external shocks (see Roger, 2010). It is in that context that inflation targeting 
policy in general evokes an escape clause to justify a temporary inability of the monetary authority to 
contain inflation within the target due to external shocks. However, South Africa being an open 
economy, there is a possibility that there will always be external shocks hitting the economy; this in 
fact will result in the escape clause becoming an ‘escape goat’ to justify the failure of the monetary 
policy tool to control inflation.  
 
A change of monetary policy stance from a simple inflation targeting to a dual target of inflation and 
employment (output growth), as applied in the USA, may be an option for bolstering monetary policy 
in South Africa. Why should the SARB continuously increase interest rate that has a neutral effect on 
inflation but compromises the growth path of the country as reported in Figure 4?   
 
Another important question is to assess the extent to which contractionary monetary policy has 
succeeded to curb credit demand in South Africa.  We ought to believe that the successful operation 
of the credit channel could contribute the effectiveness of the contractionary monetary policy to 
control inflation in South Africa. Given that a contractionary monetary policy is assumed to increase 
debt service costs and impairs assets and collateral of households and firms, contractionary monetary 
policy shocks are expected to decrease the aggregate price level (inflation) through the decrease in 
aggregate demand. 
 
Figure 5 displays the responses of the total credit extension from positive monetary policy shocks. The 
effects of monetary policy shocks on credits extension are neutral.  
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Figure 5. responses of credit extension to positive monetary policy shocks 
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This outcome confirms the findings of a number of studies that Credit extension is insensitive to high 
interest rate in South Africa.  For example, Bonga-Bonga (2008) alluded to the poor savings, especially 
household savings in South Africa, which lead to high demand for credit. The high dependence on 
debt by household has rendered credit extension insensitive to contractionary monetary policy. It is 
evident from Figure A1 that credit growth has been in an uptrend despite a continuous increase in 
interest rates. This outcome may suggest that, among other things, the inability of the monetary policy 
tool to control inflation in South Africa may be due to the insensitivity of the credit demand to 
contractionary monetary policy shocks.  
 
The outcome of this paper that positive monetary policy shock failed to curb credit extension should 
imply that the 2005 National Credit Act (NCA), as an additional measure to regulate the credit market 
in South Africa, does not prove to be an enabler to curb credit extension in south Africa. This is 
confirmed in Figure A1 showing the upward trend of credit extension, even in the periods post 2005.  
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Robustness test 
 
To test the robustness of our results, we apply different identifications, especially the zero restrictions 
in the short run matrix. We apply a zero-contemporaneous restriction for shocks to inflation on 
manufacturing production. We can observe that the results reported in Figure 6, showing the responses 
of monetary policy shocks to manufacturing production, are similar to those reported in Figure 4, 
although in Figure 6 the effects die out after 8 months rather than 10 months as in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 5. responses of manufacturing production to positive monetary policy shocks with 
different identification 
 
 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
There is an increasing debate amongst academic, policymakers, and the public as to whether inflation 
rate targeting is an effective monetary policy. In South Africa, the central bank has embarked in 
monetary tightening for more than a year, but it has been unable to bring inflation back to the target 
band. This study endeavoured to assess the effectiveness of monetary policy instrument, the repo rate, 
in influencing inflation rate in South Africa since the adoption of inflation rate targeting. The 
framework used is the structural vector error correction model that facilitates the analysis of the 
dynamics of inflation to monetary policy instrument shocks. This study found that positive monetary 
policy shocks are unable to negatively affect inflation after a period of more than 20 months. This 
pointed to the ineffectiveness monetary policy in affecting inflation in South Africa. Similarly, monetary 
policy in South Africa seems less potent in curbing demand for money, though this should be an 
important channel through which monetary policy should affect inflation. These facts prove that 
economic agents in South Africa are insensitive to short-term interest rates. Credit demand by the 
private sector remains immune to central bank policy. However, this study shows that monetary policy 
does affect the real output in South Africa. A positive monetary policy shock decreases manufacturing 
production after six to seven months.  The study concludes that   inflation rate targeting as applied in 
South Africa does not help to curb inflation and credit demand by the private sector remains immune 
to central bank policy. The study then suggests that like in the USA, a dual inflation and employment 
(real output) target may be an option to consider for monetary policy in a developing country such as 
South Africa.
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Appendix 1 
 
 
Table A1.  Unit root test at the level 
    
Series Adjusted t-statistics 
Infla -0.642 
Credit 7.273 
Interest -2.059 
Manu -0.458 
ADF is Augmented Dickey-Fuller test where the null hypothesis is of a unit root in the series. The 
estimated regressions include a constant and a trend. 
 
 
 
 
Table A2.  Johansen cointegration test 
          
Null Hypothesis 
Number of CE Eigenvalue Trace Statistics 
5% Critical 
Value Probability 
None* 0.310 79.692 63.876 0.001 
At most 1* 0.288 46.721 42.915 0.020 
At most 2 0.121 16.523 25.872 0.451 
At most 3 0.055 5.045 12.518 0.590 
 Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 5% level 
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level 
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values 
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Figure A1.  Variables 
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